


















































































Summary of a November 2007 workshop held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
by O. Emre Ergungor
In today’s increasingly sophisticated financial markets, loan modifications are often 
complex processes that involve multiple players with competing legal and financial 
interests.  To  better  understand  loan  modifications,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Cleveland hosted a one-day workshop in November 2007 featuring four financial and 
legal experts—Tony Saunders from Arizona State University, Steven Schwarcz from 
Duke University, Joseph Mason from Louisiana State University, and Kathleen Engel 
from Cleveland State University—who shared their knowledge and recommendations 
for possible solutions to the mortgage lending debacle. 
59638   1 10/1/08   9:21:27 AMloan modifications       oreclosure is an expensive resolution to a mortgage delinquency, even in the best of times. 
A typical foreclosure’s cost to the lender (or investor) has been estimated at 20–25 percent of the 
loan balance, or about $60,000 on average.1 This includes fees for litigation (for example, 
nuisance lawsuits filed by neighbors if the property is vandalized or not properly maintained), 
maintenance costs, and property taxes. Beyond the costs borne directly by the lender are those 
imposed on the community; vacant and boarded-up homes may fall into disrepair and depress 
the prices of neighboring properties. Deterioration in the quality of the housing stock may make 
lenders more stringent in their lending standards and limit area homeowners’ access to credit. 
Certainly the weakening housing market and growing number of vacant properties make it more 
difficult for investors to move these properties off their balance sheets—and turn some financial 
firms into real-estate-management companies. Any way you look at it, foreclosures are costly for 
lenders and investors, who might rather accept a lower return on their investment than own a 
piece of vacant real estate.  
 
Loan modification has been suggested as a way to keep people in their 
homes as well as a lower-cost solution to lenders’ delinquency problems. 
Simply stated, a loan modification is a permanent change in the terms of 
a mortgage loan that makes it more affordable for the borrower. Only a 
few decades ago, when lenders originated mortgages and kept them on 
their balance sheets until they were paid off, modification was a relatively 
simple process: If borrowers missed some payments, they and their 
lenders would get together, go over the finances, and find out whether a 
modification was in everyone’s best interest. Today, however, mortgages 
are bundled and sold to investors around the world through the process of 
securitization. As a result, the modification process entails many legal complexities and involves 
many parties with differing, sometimes conflicting, interests.  
 
  Given the current home financing debacle, investors, homeowners, policymakers, and 
researchers are all asking the question, what happened? To understand where and how our 
mortgage financing system failed—and how these pitfalls may hinder loan modifications—
it is helpful to consider several questions:  
• First, who are the parties involved in securitization deals involving mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)? 
• Second, what went wrong in this securitization system? 
• Third, what are the key legal issues in loan modifications? (In addressing this 
particular question, it is useful to also consider the alternatives to loan modification 
and their consequences.) 
• Fourth, what incentives affect servicers in the modification process? 














Simply stated, a loan 
modification is a perma-
nent change in the terms 
of a mortgage loan that 
makes it more affordable 
for the borrower. 
1Mason, Joseph R., Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (October 3, 2007). 













Who are the parties involved in a securitization deal?
The securitization process often begins when an investment bank (the underwriter) purchases 
mortgages from various lenders and transfers ownership of the portfolio to a special-purpose 
entity, such as a corporation, a limited liability corporation, or a business trust (see Figure 1). It 
is also common for high-volume lenders, such as Countrywide, to create their own special-purpose 
entity and do their own securitization. The special-purpose entity creates securities that represent 
claims on the interest and principal payments of the pooled mortgages in its possession, and then 
sells those securities to investors.
 
  Before any security backed by the mortgage pool can be issued, however, the underwriter hires 
a rating agency to determine how risky the pool is and to suggest credit enhancements necessary 
for raising the securities’ ratings to the desired level. For example, as a condition for the highest 
grade (AAA), the rating agency may require the purchase of insurance against mortgage defaults 
from a credit enhancer. The rating agency does not necessarily monitor the underwriter after 
issuing the initial rating and does not investigate fraud as part of its rating. Once all the necessary 
credit enhancements are in place, the trust proceeds to sell the mortgage-backed securities that 
represent claims on the cash flows from the mortgages in the pool. 
  These securities can be very complex. It is possible to take a pool of highly risky mortgages  
or other mortgage-backed securities and actually create AAA-rated securities against them. This is 
accomplished not just by various credit enhancements like those described above, but by dividing 
these securities into risk classes, or tranches. This process involves assigning some of the securities 
a more senior claim on the cash flows from the mortgage pool. In other words, the securities differ 
in who gets paid first from the interest and principal payments collected in the pool. Holders of the 
most-senior claims are paid first, so any shortfall in the cash flow caused by a delinquency or loan 
write-off reduces the payment claims that are more junior. The most-senior tranche, which will not 
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tranches of a 
securitization 
deal
There is typically a mezzanine tranche between AAA and BB, and then there is an equity tranche, 
made up of the most junior claims, that typically is unrated. Investors in high-risk securities may 
choose the lower-rated tranches, but they risk getting hit with the losses first (see Figure 2). These 
re-securitized mortgage-backed securities are known as mortgage-backed-security collateralized 
debt obligations, or MBS-CDOs. 
                  But the securitization process does not 
stop there. The securities from multiple 
issues (of any class) can be pooled again and 
re-divided into risk tranches, the most senior 
of which may again get a AAA rating. These 
arrangements are CDOs created using other 
CDOs and are known as CDO-Squares. And 
the process continues when the low-rated 
tranches of MBS-CDOs are repackaged and 
redivided into risk tranches (CDO-Cubes).  
 
  In theory, the system is set up to give each participant in the chain an incentive to fulfill 
his responsibilities properly. Given the distance between investors and homeowners, investors 
must be reasonably confident that lenders are underwriting home mortgage loans properly and 
that trustees are monitoring the performance of lenders or servicers. The market’s primary 
mechanism for ensuring that all the links in the securitization process work properly consists of 
the representations and warranties in contracts, which require other parties in the securitization 
chain to repurchase loans that are alleged to have been inappropriately underwritten or serviced, 
or to have had other failures in due diligence. There are two critical representation and warranty 
documents in the securitization chain: the mortgage loan purchase agreement (MLPA) between 
the loan seller (the lender) and the underwriter (an investment bank, Fannie Mae, or Freddie 
Mac), and the pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) between the investors participating in 
the deal and the trustee. Both of these documents often have very strict guidelines for how 
loans should be originated, underwritten, and serviced. A breach of any provision may lead to 
repurchase requests for loans that allegedly have been tainted. In other words, representations 
and warranties are the investors’ insurance against shoddy lending standards and securitization 
practices. Still, investors may engage in riskier transactions in exchange for higher returns; 
deals in which the underwriter states “we cannot assure the credit quality of the majority of the 
loans” are not unheard of. 
  The authority given to the trustee by the PSA, including the authority to modify the loan, 
is delegated to the servicer, a key player in these deals. At the most basic level, the servicer 
collects interest and principal payments and passes them on to the trustee (after deducting a 
fee for its services), maintains escrow accounts, and pays taxes and insurance premiums. The 
trustee, in turn, directs the cash flow to the investors. The stream of servicing income from a 
securitization deal and the right to service the mortgages in the pool constitute tradable assets 
known as mortgage servicing rights. The lender that originates the mortgage may choose to keep 
the servicing rights to the loans it sells to the securitization pool, or it may prefer to sell them. 
Therefore, the servicer is usually—but not always—the original lender.













What went wrong in this system?
Although mortgage finance securitization evolved with the assumption that there were enough 
contractual incentives to ensure that each participant in the process would perform his 
responsibilities properly, the experts at our workshop agreed that the system failed at several 
points. The strong housing market in the early part of this decade, along with the expectation 
that values would continue to rise, may have induced people to purchase too much housing 
and leave themselves exposed to a housing downturn. Then home prices fell and ARM resets 
approached. Homeowners and real estate speculators who had assumed that continuing 
appreciation would allow them to refinance their mortgages before their loans reset, either could 
no longer afford their payments or lost their incentive to make higher payments on properties 
whose value was often less than what was owed. In the end, investors or lenders who were holding 
those loans lost a significant amount of money. The price index in Figure 3 shows that BBB-rated 
residential-mortgage-backed securities, which were trading at $97 in January 2007, traded as 
low as $5 some 18 months later. The more troubling 
observation is that the safest, AAA-rated tranche, which 
was trading at $100 in early summer 2007, lost more 
than 25 percent of its value within six months and as of 
July 2008 was down more than 40 percent.
         igure 3 raises the question of how a security capable of losing 25 percent of its value 
within a year of its creation could have been judged AAA by the rating agencies. Also worth 
asking is how investors—particularly sophisticated ones, including large institutional investors 
and hedge funds—could have so seriously misgauged the risk of these securities. Looking back, 
investors do not seem to have been fully aware of the risk of the securities they were buying. 
One explanation proposed by our workshop participants was that rating agencies misjudged the 
downside risks because their models lacked a sufficient history showing how securities backed 
by subprime mortgages or similar assets performed. An alternative explanation discussed by 
the participants centered on rating agencies’ possible conflicts of interest. Such conflicts arise, 
they contented, partly because ratings are paid for by the issuer of the securities rather than the 
investor whose decision is based on that rating. Conceivably, the desire to bring in new business 
may have caused rating agencies to provide overly optimistic assessments of the risk of asset-backed 
securities, leading to artificially high ratings. Moreover, it was not uncommon for rating agencies 
to be consulted on the structure of the securitization; such involvement may have affected their 
objectivity. Less clear is why the potential loss of the agencies’ reputation, and with it, their ability 
to sell their rating services, did not induce them to provide unbiased assessments of the risk of the 
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Banks began to securitize a 
large volume of their loan port-
folios in response to changing 
regulations and market forces 
during the 1980s. Starting 
with the International Bank-
ing Act of 1978, and partially 
in response to debt problems 
of the less-developed countries 
during the early 1980s, federal 
regulators ratcheted up mini-
mum capital requirements for 
commercial banks. By the mid-
1980s, banks were required to 
hold primary capital (basically 
shareholder equity and reserves 
set aside for future loan losses) 
of at least 5.5 cents for every 
dollar of assets carried on the 
balance sheet. Capital require-
ments limit the risks banks will 
take by putting bank owners’ 
own money at risk. However, 
raising capital is costly for the 
bank owners. For example, reg-
ulators may force the bank to 
raise equity when stock market 
conditions are not favorable for 
a new stock issue, or the bank 
may have to retain its earnings 
instead of distributing them to 
shareholders as dividends.
  But there is a way to circum-
vent capital requirements, and 
it hinges on the fact that the 
Excerpt from “Securitization,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary 
August 15, 2003
Why securitize?
bank does not have to hold 
capital against the loans it orig-
inates, but only those it actually 
carries on its balance sheet. So, 
there is no capital requirement 
if the bank originates the loans 
and transfers their ownership 
to a special purpose entity,  
effectively removing them from 
its balance sheet. Unless there is 
an arrangement in the securiti-
zation deal whereby investors 
can demand compensation 
from the bank for loan defaults 
in the securitized asset pool 
(recourse), regulators allow 
banks to keep these loans off 
the balance sheet, reducing the 
need for additional capital.
  The ability to remove loans 
from the balance sheet was 
especially handy for credit card 
banks because the Competitive 
Equality Banking Act of 1987 
limited their total asset growth 
to 7 percent a year. Major lend-
ers in this market had to find 
a way to remove their credit 
card receivables from their 
balance sheets. Securitizing 
those receipts helped banks to 
keep their asset growth under 
control, while they collected 
fees for servicing the securitized 
loans. It should not come as a 
surprise that credit card asset-
backed securities first appeared 
in the public debt market in 
1987.
  In addition to these changes 
in the regulatory environment, 
the deposit market—banks’  
traditional funding source—
went through significant 
changes in the 1980s. With the 
Great Depression and bank 
failures a distant memory, 
depositors were willing to take 
more risk in return for higher 
rewards by shifting their money 
into money market funds and 
other uninsured investments. 
As deposits became increasingly 
scarce and expensive, banks 
had few options. One was to 
give up lending opportunities—
not a first choice. Another 
was (and still is) to finance 
loans with short-term borrow-
ings from the money markets. 
Yet, unlike deposits, these are 
not a stable source of financ-
ing: Short-term lenders in this 
highly liquid market chase the 
highest rate of interest and pull 
their money out at the slight-
est sign of trouble. Under these 
circumstances, recycling existing 
resources—by selling existing 
loans and using the proceeds to 
make new loans—is an invalu-
able capability.
sideBaR
59638   6 10/1/08   9:21:28 AM      ut the potential for these conflicts should have been clear to investors, who in turn should 
have priced the risk into the contracts. Where did the investors go wrong? One possibility 
suggested is that investors had all the information they needed about these instruments, but they 
failed to read it thoroughly or did not understand sufficiently what they were purchasing.  
  One possible explanation for such behavior is that these financial instruments were so complex 
that investors failed to do their homework, in part because they often had limited time in which to 
make a decision. The prospectuses for these securities are hundreds of pages long; the analyst, who 
has only a short time to make a decision, may ignore the prospectus and instead rely more heavily 
on the reputation of the underwriters for issuing good paper.  
  Shortcomings in the rating system aside, the investment banks who packaged these securities 
should have had the proper incentives to issue good paper. Like the rating agencies, their reputation 
and ability to sell paper in the future depend on it. Also, in all the CDO deals, the underwriters 
always took a piece of the equity tranche, the lowest-rated piece. Many investors may have believed 
that the underwriters would not issue bad paper given that they were first in line to face the losses. 
However, the incentive scheme offered no protection against the risk that underwriters themselves 
may have underestimated the risk of the assets backing the paper they were issuing. 
  In the end, not only the investors but also the underwriters lost large sums. The investors 
may also have over-relied on their contractual protections, such as the representations and 
warranties that require lenders to buy back their improperly originated loans. Loan repurchases 
may have been an effective threat when the number of requests was fairly small, but when the 
number increased, loan sellers became more reluctant to admit that there was a problem with the 
origination and underwriting. Instead, cases are now likely to go to court and may not be resolved 
for five or six years. In other words, a protection that works well when problem loans are few may 
become a perverse incentive for loan sellers when such demands for recourse multiply. In that  
case, investors’ losses may be much larger than they first anticipated. 
  According to the workshop participants, lenders’ reluctance to take back their problem loans 
under the terms of the representations and warranties may have more complex causes than a desire 
to avoid loss by dragging out the matter in court for years. Some lenders may lack the equity 
capital to admit to those losses and still stay in business. When a regulated depository institution 
(e.g., a commercial bank, savings and loan, etc.) makes a loan and keeps it on its balance sheet, it 
is required to fund a portion of the loan with its own capital. Presumably, lenders who have their 
own “skin in the game” are more careful with the risks they undertake. It is also assumed that if 
and when lenders suffer unexpected losses, they will have enough capital to take those hits and still 
survive. Securitization has prompted financial institutions to change the way they calculate how 
much capital is needed to support their activities. The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s 
(FASB) Statement 140 stipulates that lenders securitizing their loans in qualified special-purpose 
entities (QSPEs) are allowed to remove them entirely from their balance sheets (most common 
securitization deals of the kind pictured in Figure 1 qualify as QSPEs). As in a traditional loan 
sale, FASB 140 allows lenders to sidestep the capital regulations on their pools of securitized assets 
because the loans are no longer on the balance sheet—and financial institutions are not responsible 
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How could top-rated  
securities lose their value  
so abruptly?
- Rating agencies did not have   
  sufficient historical data to  
  accurately assess risk.
- Rating agencies had conflict    
  of interests, which may have   
  affected their objectivity.
How could investors not  
assess risk accurately?
Rational views
- information was available    
  but complex; investors relied  
  on rating and reputation of  
  underwriter.
- underwriters underestimated   
  the risks given the securities’   
  stellar performance in past  
  years.
- Over-reliance on contrac- 
  tual protections (warranties    
  and representations) that work  
  well for a few bad loans but    
  are counterproductive when    
  most loans are problematic.
Bounded rationality
- during the housing bubble,  
  investors and underwriters  
  became disconnected from  
  reality.
- lured by CdOs’ spread,  
  investors engaged in herd  
  behavior, paying less attention  
  to the quality of the loans.












1Reuters, November 21, 2007.
loan modifications
 In addition, growing numbers of mortgages are originated through mortgage brokers 
and other lenders not subject to regulatory capital requirements. One would expect that the 
market would require them to hold sufficient capital against unexpected losses as a precondition 
of funding their activities; however, if the risk of the underlying assets—in this case, subprime 
mortgages—is systematically underestimated, then the capital that markets require of mortgage 
originators might be too little to ensure prudent underwriting standards for the loans these lenders 
originate. From the market’s perspective, investors may have stopped demanding that institutions 
hold sufficient capital to cushion against an unexpected homecoming of bad loans because the 
risks seemed low during the housing boom and credit enhancements seemed sufficient.  
  The workshop experts also contemplated some explanations suggesting that lenders and 
investors may have behaved irrationally. One hypothesis was that the housing market went 
through a bubble, during which lenders, borrowers, underwriters, and everybody else may have 
seriously underestimated the risks they were undertaking. At any given time, one would expect 
some people to underestimate the risks and others to overestimate them; in theory, then, these 
people should cancel each other out. The compelling question in the case of the mortgage debacle 
is, how did everyone land on the over-optimistic side of the housing market? Psychologists 
and behavioral economists explain this phenomenon in terms of bounded rationality, or “herd 
behavior.” That is, a market with continuously declining interest margins, investors and lenders 
tried to benefit from the spread on the mortgage and mortgage-CDO products without paying 
close attention to what they were originating or buying. With everybody taking the same risks and 
making a lot of money—and nobody going bankrupt—lenders and investors thought these risks 
were worth taking. Our workshop experts observed that relaxed investor attitudes toward risk 
are not limited to the mortgage market. Bond covenants, which keep a tight rein on borrowers’ 
behavior in order to protect lenders’ interests, also became less restrictive in recent years, as 
lenders took on more risk in return for greater yield. 
What are the key legal issues in loan modifications?  
The financial system is currently recovering from an extended period of loosely supervised credit 
growth. As part of this process, financial institutions around the world are writing off large 
numbers of nonperforming loans. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, these write-offs could reach hundreds of billions of dollars.1 However, many 
financially troubled homeowners can still be put on a path to sustainable homeownership. Some 
have suffered from lenders’ poor underwriting standards and gotten into loans with much more 
costly terms than their income and credit history would warrant. To help these homeowners and to 
avoid the dead-weight losses associated with default and foreclosure, most mortgage servicers are 
ramping up their loan modification programs, which were originally designed to help the occasional 
borrower who experienced an economic shock, like sudden unemployment or health crisis. 
 
  A loan modification can take many forms. In one, the missed payments are tacked on to the 
loan. For example, if the borrower missed six payments on a loan that was originally scheduled to 
be paid off in 30 years, the loan can be restructured as a 30-year-6-month loan. Alternatively, the 
loan principal can be increased by the amount of the missed payments so that it is still paid off 
Glossary
collateralized debt obligation 
(CDO) 
diversified, multi-class security 
backed by pools of bonds, bank 
loans, or other assets. these 
securities are typically divided into 
several classes, or bond tranches, 
that have differing levels of credit 
risk exposure. 
CDO-squares and CDO-cubes 
CdO-squares are the result of 
pooling and re-division of multiple 
issues of collateralized debt 
obligations to create new CdOs 
based on risk tranches.  With 
CdO-cubes, multiple issues of 
low-rated CdOs are pooled and 
re-divided to create new CdOs.
foreclosure 
a process by which a homeowner 
who has not made timely payments 
of principal and interest on a 
mortgage loses title to the home. 
statutory foreclosure is effected 
without recourse to courts, but 
must conform to laws (statutes).  
Judicial foreclosure submits the 
process to court supervision.
loan modification 
an adjustment to the terms of a 
loan during its duration in a way 
not accounted for in the original 
loan contract, but accepted later 
by mutual consent of the lender 
and borrower. usually a concession 
to the borrower in an attempt to 
avoid foreclosure. 
mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
a financial claim on the cash flow
from a pool of mortgage loans 
Adapted from allbusiness.com












continued on next page
loan modifications in 30 years but each remaining monthly payment is larger. Another possibility is forgiveness. The 
missed principal, interest, and fee payments can be forgiven; even the principal can be reduced to 
make the loan more affordable. Other terms of the loan are also open to negotiation. For example, 
subprime loans almost always have prepayment penalties that prevent borrowers from refinancing 
into more affordable products; these penalties can be reduced or eliminated.
  Loan modifications are not always the answer. Sometimes it is in neither the investor’s nor the 
borrower’s interest to restructure the loan. Even in such cases, it may still be in everyone’s interest 
to resolve the loan default by avoiding foreclosure. That is, there are negotiated alternatives to 
foreclosure that do not involve renegotiating the loan terms themselves, but enable borrowers 
to simply hand in the keys without being foreclosed on. There was general agreement at the 
workshop that if borrowers give their deed in lieu of foreclosure, the blemish on their credit report 
is less severe than if there were a foreclosure.
  Before securitizing mortgages became common practice, any of these alternatives could 
be negotiated between the borrower and lender and brought to a quick resolution. Today, 
securitization makes the process more difficult, costly, and laden with legal challenges. From a 
legal perspective, loan servicers have specific authority under pooling and servicing agreements to 
modify loans within limits. In other words, they are allowed to change loans at their own discretion 
to a certain extent, beyond which they must get special approval; often, such approval must come 
from the insurers who are providing a credit enhancement, as they are in the first-loss position.
 
 An approval from the insurer, however, is not the end of the matter. If there is to be a 
modification, the servicer can justify it only if it is in the best interest of investors. In fact, servicers 
are expected to take the same financially responsible actions they would take if they owned the 
loans they service. In other words, there is no basis for modification if a loan is performing but the 
borrower was the victim of some type of mortgage fraud—for example, loan terms were changed  
at the last minute and the borrower wasn’t informed. Modifications can take place only if they 
benefit the investors, even if there was wrongdoing in the origination of the loan.
  The challenge is to define what is in investors’ best interest. What criteria can the servicer 
use to justify a loan modification without getting sued by investors? Our experts considered some 
pooling and servicing agreements relatively easy to work with because they explicitly set the 
standards for loan modifications and specify which loans can be modified, how this may be done, 
and under what conditions. Some agreements permit the servicer to modify up to 5 percent of the 
loans in the pool or up to 5 percent of the pool’s value, or a fixed number of loans per year. There 
are also standards for the length of the borrower’s delinquency before the loan can be modified. 
Different rules may apply if the servicer believes that the borrower may default in the future, if 
the borrower is only a few days late, or if the borrower has been more than 90 days delinquent. 
Some pooling and servicing agreements state that the servicer may modify the loan only if it is in 
default or near default and may prevent proactive modifications that could take place as soon as 
Glossary
mortgage servicing rights 
a contractual agreement allowing 
the servicer to deduct a fee from 
the interest and principal payments 
it collects before passing them 
along to the trustee, as well as 
obliging the servicer to maintain 
escrow accounts and pay taxes 
and insurance premiums 
pooling and servicing 
agreement (PSA) 
the contractual agreement 
between investors in a mbs-CdO 
and the security’s trustees 
detailing the gridlines on how 
the loans in a given mbs-CdO 
are originated, underwritten, 
and serviced   
representations and 
warranties 
the contractual agreement 
between the lender and the trustee 
that requires that loans in default  
that have been inappropriately  
underwritten or had failures in 
respect to due diligence be repur-
chased or replaced 
securitization 
the process of creating a 
security that is saleable in the 
capital markets and backed 
by a package of assets, such 
as mortgage loans
mortgage servicing 
activity that consists of collecting 
monthly interest and principal 
payments, taxes, and insurance 
from borrowers, as well as assuring 
that taxes and insurance are paid 
to the assessor and insurer and that 
interest earned and principal are 
paid to the investor

















Source: Bank  
of America
     Delinquent    Foreclosure  Performing Loan
Servicing costs      $51  $51  $51
Non-reimbursable costs      $316  $316
Funding costs for reimbursable expenses    $659  $1,086
Reduction to MSR fair value       $662
Total annualized cost per loan    $1,026  $2,115  $51 
  
the servicer realizes that the existing mortgage terms will become unsustainable. This restriction 
derives from tax code consequences: Most mortgage securitizations are REMICs (real estate 
mortgage investment conduits), which are not subject to tax liabilities as long as their mortgage 
pools remain constant—that is, there is not a lot of change. The only exception is that REMICs 
may change the composition of the pool if the underlying collateral is on the verge of, or in, 
default. In other words, if the administrators of REMICs allow proactive modifications, they may 
face a tax bill.
  Some pooling and servicing agreements are difficult to work with simply because they are 
vague.  They may state that servicers can modify loans as long as they comply with “acceptable 
servicing standards,” without defining “acceptable.”
  As the discussion so far shows, servicers have no uniform, practical standards to follow across 
all types of pooling and servicing agreements. What is a servicer to do? The risk of misinterpreting 
the vague clauses of the pooling and servicing agreement and getting sued is only one of many 
factors that affect servicers’ decisions about how to deal with a delinquent borrower. 
What are servicers’ incentives in the modification process? 
Apart from the modification options that may or may not be spelled out in the loans’ pooling and 
servicing agreements, servicers have certain financial incentives to modify or foreclose on a loan. 
To better understand servicers’ overall incentives in this process, let’s consider their expenses and 
revenue flows in each of the following two scenarios.
  It costs $51 a year on average to service a mortgage paid on time; this covers the labor and 
paperwork associated with collecting payments and disbursing them to the trust. In this case, the 
servicer’s compensation from the trustee is about equal to the costs. However, when a loan goes 
into default, the process becomes a lot more expensive: The annualized cost per mortgage jumps 
from $51 to $1,026 for delinquent loans and $2,115 for loans in foreclosure.
 
  Some of those costs are reimbursable. For example, while the borrower remains delinquent, 
the servicer must advance cash to investors as if the borrower had made the payment on time. 
In this case, the servicer must fund itself from the capital markets and incur interest costs. There 
are also expenses associated with placing the delinquent loan into special servicing. The servicer 
must make the extra phone calls, send the extra letters, and talk with the borrower. In the case of 
foreclosure, the servicer also must start the legal filings. The servicer expects to be reimbursed for 
these expenses only when the foreclosed property is sold, which takes an average of 18 months.
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modification process
  There are also nonreimbursable costs, such as the $316 administrative costs of managing and 
monitoring special servicing programs to handle delinquent loans. This cost, which can not be 
passed on to the investors, is borne entirely by the servicer. Another nonreimbursable cost unique to 
foreclosures is the lost servicing income from the loan that has been written off. The loss of servicing 
fees that would have been paid had the loan remained active adds up to $662. This is reflected  
on the servicer’s balance sheet as a $662 decline in the value of the mortgage servicing rights.
  The cost of a mortgage modification is similar to that of servicing a delinquent loan, around 
$750 to $1,000. The main difference is that the way the servicer will be compensated for the costs 
of modification is typically not a part of pooling and servicing agreements; these agreements were 
not designed for such massive modifications, which have not often been necessary in the history of 
these contracts. As a result, the modification cost of $750 to $1,000 per loan is a nonreimbursable 
expense for the servicer.
  On the positive side, although the cost of the modification is not reimbursable, the flow of 
servicing fees will resume once the loan becomes current again. In other words, the modification 
will mitigate the decline in the value of the mortgage servicing rights. Unfortunately, there is a 
significant chance that borrower will default again, this time on a modified loan. That is, a loan 
that has become current through modification is much more likely to default than a loan that has 
never been delinquent. Furthermore, if the modification has not resolved the borrower’s distress 
in a meaningful way, the homeowner is likely to continue to defer maintenance on the property, 
eroding its value. So, if the modification merely delays an eventual foreclosure, the servicer will 
still bear the nonreimbursable costs of the foreclosure, and the investors will ultimately get less.
  By comparison, a foreclosure is a much cleaner process for the servicer for three reasons:  
First, in a foreclosure the servicer gets paid. Second, foreclosure avoids the possibility of the  
servicer being sued for exceeding its authority under the pooling and servicing agreement in the 
event the servicer, attempting to work out a loan, exercises what might be viewed as unjustified or 
excessive modifications. By comparison, pooling and servicing agreements do not limit foreclosures. 
Third, foreclosure can help prop up rating agencies’ grades of loan servicers, since their grading 
system rewards those who can extract the most cash out of the pool by minimizing or absorbing  
the losses. If a modification only delays foreclosure, and investors eventually get less than they  
would have if the property had been sold at the first sign of trouble, the rating agency can 
downgrade the servicer and reduce the flow of future business. In short, for a servicer, foreclosure  
is often the least troublesome solution to the delinquency problem.
Where do we go from here?
Our experts agreed that the financial and social costs of delinquencies and foreclosures will lead 
to improved regulatory and market-based discipline. On the regulatory side, policymakers will 
examine which gaps in our legal and regulatory structure led to careless lending. One issue in 
particular that requires a closer look is some mortgage lenders’ apparent lack of capital.  
  One proposal that arose from the workshop discussion involved having lenders hold capital 
against their securitized loans, so that they are ready to realize their losses instantly if those loans 
are ever returned to them under the representations and warranties. This is the practice in the UK, 
where lenders must hold a nominal 1 percent of capital against their securitized loans. (The point 
here is not that 1 percent is the correct amount, but rather, that the practice exists outside the U.S.)
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to discipline mortgage lenders by forcing them to hold more capital or by increasing the 
over-collateralization of securitization deals. In fact, our experts believe that the main stimulus 
for change will be market discipline. For example, the market may disallow the sale and 
securitization of entire mortgage portfolios unless the original lender holds a first-loss position. 
This is what banks do when they sell commercial loan participations. No one would buy the 
loans if the bank tried to unload the entire portfolio. The same is likely to happen in the mortgage 
market, noted the seminar experts, who also expect to see more transparency in securitization 
deals. Currently, investors receive no information about the original lender’s ability to honor its 
representations and warranties. If a lender lacks the capital base to take back a troubled loan, 
representations and warranties are useless to investors.
  Investors will probably demand more economically meaningful grading from the rating  
agencies. Currently, ratings seem to have little to do with risk. For example, one can find 
municipal bonds at the BAA level that have a 0.097 percent default rate and, at the other end of 
the scale, BAA CDOs with a 24 percent default rate. Thus, one alphabetic rating encompasses a 
270-time magnitude of risk difference. This type of low-quality information is unlikely to persist. 
 
  The experts at our workshop expressed the belief that the fastest way to restore financial 
markets’ normal functioning is to let them feel the pain; however, they also recognized that 
this approach risks setting off a downward spiral. Large numbers of defaults could put severe 
downward pressure on housing prices, causing greater losses when defaults occur; such losses, in 
turn, could cause further declines in market liquidity and restart the default cycle. Although this 
risk is real, it may be better than postponing the pain and facing greater difficulties in the future.
  At this point, the outlook remains uncertain, and the experts did not seem convinced  
that extensive modifications could mitigate the uncertainty. Although servicers have had some 
experience historically with performing loan modifications, it has never been on this scale, 
where so much money is at stake and so many borrowers are in trouble. Still, there is one 
principle that everybody agreed on: With any proposal relating to modifications, investors, 
servicers, and regulators need to make sure that the process can accomplish the objective of 
converting nonperforming loans into performing loans rather than simply forestalling the 
inevitable. It makes no sense to push defaults into the future, especially when housing prices 
are dropping and there is no sign that a turnaround is imminent.
At this point, 
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